




Working Paper n° 59, 2006
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI ROMA TRE
DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIAUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI ROMA TRE
DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA





 - I “Working Papers” del Dipartimento di Economia svolgono la funzione di divulgare
tempestivamente, in forma definitiva o provvisoria, i risultati di ricerche scientifiche
originali. La loro pubblicazione è soggetta all’approvazione del Comitato Scientifico.
- Per ciascuna pubblicazione vengono soddisfatti gli obblighi previsti dall’art. 1 del D.L.L.
31.8.1945, n. 660 e successive modifiche.
- Copie della presente pubblicazione possono essere richieste alla Redazione.
REDAZIONE:
Dipartimento di Economia
Università degli Studi Roma Tre
Via Ostiense, 139 - 00154 Roma
Tel. 0039-6-57374003  fax 0039-6-57374093








* Paper presented at the EAEPE (European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy) conference, 10-12
November 2005, Bremen (Germany). The paper was awarded “The Herbert Simon Young Scholar Price 2005” by
the EAEPE scientific committee.
** Pasquale Tridico is a Research Fellow at the “Dipartimento di Economia - Università degli Studi di Roma Tre”.
He would like to thank Anna Gwiazda for her support and useful suggestions. Moreover he is grateful to
Sebastiano Fadda and Valeria Costantini for their comments on an earlier draft, and to Pasquale De Muro and
Salvatore Monni for their help. Special thanks to all the participants of  2005 EAEPE conference. The usual
disclaimer applies.1. Introduction 5
2. The Great Transformation 9
3. The Great Recession  15
4. The Social Cost of Transition 18
5. A Human Development Approach 23
6. Human Development and Economic Growth in Transition Economies 25
7. Institutions, Governance and Development 35
Final Remarks  40
References 42
Appendix 48  5 
 
Abstract. Transition economies (i.e. Central Eastern Europe Countries and Former Soviet 
Union Republics) have undergone an enormous transformation since 1989-1991. After the 
recession of the early 1990’s, some of these economies experienced a GDP recovery, at a different 
pace, with different outcomes in terms of economic growth and social performance (i.e. human 
development, employment, poverty, etc). The aim of this paper is to answer the following research 
question: was human development concurrent with economic growth during transition towards the 
market economy? I claim that economic growth is not always concurrent with human 
development: economic growth can contribute to increase the level of human development, but is 
not “the means” to human development. The income is not the final aim. On the contrary, the final 
aim is the well-being of individuals and the human development. Human development is 
considered to be a process which allows for an environment where people enjoy long, healthy and 
creative lives (as defined by the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP). Using an OLS 
model, human development variables were correlated with GDP per capita. I found out that, in 
transition economies, investing in human development is a sufficient, yet not a necessary condition 
for economic growth. GDP growth, then, requires human development. In this context institutions 
and institutional policies are crucial for a development process. In fact, for better distribution and 
access to resources as well as for social cohesion, well-designed institutions are needed.  
 





Many economists agree that institutional transformation lies at the heart of 
Post-Communist Transition.  However, different conceptions of institution create 
different interpretations of that transformation. After the fall of Berlin wall in 
1989, Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and Former Soviet Union 
Republics, actual Confederation of Independent State (CIS), began transformation 
towards a market economy.
1 The change was very significant: both the economic 
and the institutional frameworks were significantly changed. Today in the CEECs 
and in CIS, there are guarantees of private property, new banks, new economic 
and administrative organizations, and other formal institutions exogenously 
imposed in a short time and by political decisions. Yet the behavioral rules have 
                                                 
1 I include in the analysis, as transition economies, also Yugoslavian Republics and Albania. On the contrary, 
this paper does not refer to China, Vietnam and other Communist countries, which to some extent  have 
begun a transformation towards a market economy.   6 
not completely changed. Institutions are defined as “a set of social rules that structure 
social interaction” (Knight, 1992: 2). Consequently, in order to change institutions 
those prevalent social rules need to be changed. Informal economic institutions (i.e. 
not codified and prevalent social rules) are far from a completed change. Economic 
agents often continue to think in terms of a previous economic logic.  
Given the concept of institutions, including both formal and informal 
institutions, it is no longer sufficient to change formal institutions in order to achieve 
another system.  What is more important is to “change the mentality” of economic 
agents. I argue that old institutions may continue to function in the new system even if 
they are inefficient because current institutions are contingent on the past.  There exists 
a self-reinforcing process which allows for the path-dependency of institutions. 
Moreover, interaction between new formal rules and old social customs will affect the 
evolutionary path of institutions. In fact, in transition economies, certain institutions 
survive, even if they appear inefficient, while others disappear. That is why each society 
has its own history, its path of development, its habits and its behavioral rules. In other 
words its own values (North, 1990). 
Therefore transition from a planned system towards a market economy 
cannot be realized simply through the introduction of reforms. Neither 
development will easily be archieved. In order to start up a development process, 
transition economies need a radical transformation which involves social norms 
and informal institutions, relationships among the various powers, values and 
lobbies. Hence, development might be defined as economic growth through 
institutional change. As Kuznets (1965: 30) states: “The transformation of an 
underdeveloped in developed country is not merely  the mechanical addition of a 
stock physical capital: it is a thoroughgoing revolution in the patterns of life and a 
cardinal change in the relative powers and position of various groups in the 
population [..].  The growth [..] must overcome the resistance of a whole complex   7 
of established interest and values”. In line with this approach, I argue that capital 
and human accumulation as well as technology and macroeconomic stabilization 
programs are necessary conditions, yet they are not sufficient conditions for 
economic growth because an institutional framework which regularizes the use 
and the distribution of those factors is required.   
During this process, institutional policies and role of the State are needed.  
However, the role of institutions, in particular at the beginning of the transition 
process, has been largely underestimated or ignored. At the beginning of the 
transition process, the prevalent idea among economists and international 
economic organizations was an “anti-institutional” approach to resolve the 
economic problems of transition economics. The Washington Consensus in a few 
of its ten points “suggested” abandoning many institutions of economic policy 
(Williamson, 1990). Moreover, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) advised very strict fiscal and monetary policies for all the transition 
countries indifferently. The result was a significant recession. Furthermore, a state 
of institutional vacuum, chaos and disorganization in the economic framework 
was created. Oliver Blanchard (1997: 10) refers to this period as a systemic 
vacuum and as an economy of chaos. 
I argue that if the formal economic institutions are neglected, informal 
institutions and processes of spontaneous forces prevail. This informal 
institutionalization may also be parastatal or illegal. Examples include: the mafia, 
organized crime, a corrupt bureaucracy, an informal economic network among 
agents, lobbies, etc. These forces fill the systemic vacuum.  These kinds of informal 
institutions will generate an informal and illegal economy. Economic 
underdevelopment forces will prevail and human development will be lowered.   
Moreover, economic relations will be weakened and transaction costs will increase, 
negatively affecting economic growth.    8 
In such a situation, transition towards a market economy would favor to 
better organized groups, elite, more western oriented regions, trade oriented firms, 
people and groups in dominant position, while could bring about disadvantages to 
less organized groups, firms and lobbies dealing with traditional sectors such as 
agriculture and heavy industry and which are experiencing a restructuring process, 
periphery regions, etc. Therefore development will be uneven poverty will 
emerge, and recession could take place in many regions, increasing cleavages and 
curbing development.  
Central and Eastern European Countries and CIS experienced such an 
evolution (Nuti, 1999).  Just after the fall of the Berlin wall, systemic change 
caused a huge recession (Kornai, 1994). Moreover, vacuum power and economic 
disorganization deepened the economic crisis (Blanchard, 1997). Finally 
implemented policies were not always able to withstand the crises and solve 
economic problems. On the contrary they often caused unnecessary overshooting, 
monetary squeezing, lack of investments, the over-hasty abandoning of the 
economy by public firms, and fiscal policies that were too austere (Kolodko and 
Nuti, 1997). After economic recession, a few transition economies such as 
Slovenia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic started to grow and to recover 
income level, reaching and sometime overtaking the pre-1989 GDP per capita 
level. In the mid-Nineties, those countries (in particular Slovenia and Poland) 
implemented institutional policies and governance processes which allowed first 
an increase in the human development level and then a fast GDP growth. 
However, in the rest of transition economies human development, measured using 
the Human Development Index (HDI) of United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), was not always parallel with GDP growth .  
On the contrary, we can observe evidence of growth, or economic 
recovery, without a consistent development. But in general, only countries which 
experienced increase in the human development level had a sustained economic   9 
growth. Hence it seems to us that, in transition economies, human development is 
a sufficient, although not a necessary, condition for economic growth. It means 
that there may be economic growth without human development, but if there is 
human development then there will be economic growth. Hovever, this has to be 
tested (section 6). 
Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. Enlarging 
people’s choices is achieved by expanding human capabilities and functioning 
(Sen, 1999).  At all levels of development the three essential capabilities for 
human development are for people to lead long and healthy lives, to be 
knowledgeable and to have a decent standard of living. If these basic capabilities 
are not achieved, many choices are simply not available and many opportunities 
remain inaccessible (UNDP, 1999).  
Section 2 and 3 describe the main policies and strategies implemented 
during transition. In all transition economies, the great transformation led to a 
great recession. GDP recovery and different development paths will be analyzed.  
In section 4 I will focus on the social costs of the transition, trying to find some 
causality relations with policies and institutions implemented. In section 5 I will 
adopt a Human Development approach in order to analyze the results of the 
transition. In section 6 I will test my main hypothesis, i.e. whether GDP growth 
requires human development. For this purpose an OLS model was used in order to 
correlate human development variables (i.e. life expectancy index, education 
index) with GDP per capita. In the final 7
th section, I will discuss the role of 
institutions and governance in transition, trying to understand why some countries 
(i.e. Poland and Slovenia in particular) performed better. I will focus on the case 
of Poland. Some conclusions will follow.  
 
   10 
2. The great transformation 
 
Central and Eastern European Countries differ significantly in terms of economic 
performance, although economic policies advised by international organizations and 
implemented by national authorities are quite similar.  Those countries were also different 
under centralized planning. Initial conditions among CEECs were very different. 
Economic structure (i.e. productive specialization, labor division, technologies, output 
etc.) was diverse, as well as rules, aims and planning, were diverse in spite of common 
membership of the communist block (Falcetti et al., 2000).  
The transition, or better, the great transformation, is even more difficult 
and complex to analyze if we consider the whole former communist archipelago, 
i.e Russia and the other former Soviet Republics (now Commonwealth of 
Independent States - CSI), the Balkan countries and CEECs. An approximate 
taxation would be possible considering EBRD indices which show the progress of 
former communist countries as regards reforms towards market economy 
institutions.
2 The leading group involves: Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, immediately followed by Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia.  There follows a 
smaller group made up of Latvia and Lithuania. On the other side there are countries 
which have made very little progress towards a market economy and still have an 
almost central planned system such as: Belarus, Turkmenistan e Tajikistan (Transition 
Report 2001). In an intermediate position there is a group of countries made up by 
some former soviet Republics such as Russia and Ukraine plus some Balkan countries 
such as Romania and Bulgaria (the next EU accession countries), Albania and the 
former Yugoslavian Republics with the exception of Croatia which has more similar 
features to the first group. All these countries (27 according to EBRD)
3 are generally 
                                                 
2 EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) indices rank between 1 and 4+. These indices 
concern the following variables: Enterprise, Privatisation, Price liberalisation, Foreign Trade, Governance, 
Competition, Infrastructures, and Financial Institutions. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which are 
the most advanced in the reform process, have the highest indices (Cfr Transition Report 2001).  
3 However, data are available for all but Serbia & Montenegro (hence 26 countries).   11 
called transition economies. However, the transition process proceeds at very different 
and controversial paces and often in very critical political conditions such as civil war, 
dramatic political instability, dictatorship, etc (Chilosi, 2002). 
Nevertheless Washington based international organizations had a common recipe 
for these countries. This recipe is known as Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990). 
According to Nuti (1999), the Washington Consensus ideology allowed for the following 
interpretation of the transformation of former communist countries: Transition = 
Liberalization + Privatization. They believed – as Nuti (1999), critically, pointed out - 
that it was enough to liberalize prices, to privatize State Owned Enterprises (SOE), and to 
open the international trade in order to have an efficient market economy. After that, 
markets would take the place of central planners (Sachs 1991). Moreover, shrinking of 
monetary and fiscal policies would be a complementary requirement.  
Economists’ views on these policies have been quite controversial and diverse. 
Some economists criticize the timing of implementation; others criticize the intensity of 
policies, and others the need and the appropriateness. This set of policies delivered 
important economic shocks, provoking a huge overshooting of the exchange rates which 
generated effects greater than those expected. The economic variables involved were: 
Variables Aims4 
exchange  rate    reduction of public expenditure and 
government balance  
import tariffs, export subsidies, commercial 
policy  
privatization of public assets and SOE  
subsidies to firms  and SOE  reduction of inflation  
tax and fiscal policy   price liberalization  
interest rate and monetary policy   competition and global economy integration 
international regime  attract FDI 
prices and wages  flexible wage but with anti-inflation anchors  
                                                 
4 The table does not show a one-to-one correspondence between variables and aims.   12 
At the beginning of transition the exchange rate in former CEECs was 
overvalued. It was made convertible by a government decree and strongly 
undervalued
5. The average of trade tariffs fell immediately. In Poland for instance 
it fell from 18.5% to 5.5% (MacBean, 2000). The effect of these policies in some 
cases generated a trade surplus (as in Poland in 1990) which many economists 
considered not necessary (Nuti, 1996).  In some countries (i.e. Poland, the Czech 
Republic) the IMF transformation recipe was implemented through a “shock 
therapy” strategy, in others (Hungary, Slovenia) a more gradual approach was 
adopted (see table 9 for an overview of all countries). Nevertheless the aim, in 
both cases, was to introduce a market economy and to reduce or to eliminate the 
role of the State in the economy. It is important to underline that countries such as 
Hungary and Slovenia adopted a gradual program of macroeconomic stabilization 
and reached similar results to those of Poland and the Czech Republic, which 
implemented a shock therapy program. On the contrary Russia and Bulgaria, which 
also implemented a shock therapy program, had very negative performances. This 
seems to confirm that macroeconomic policies are context-dependent, i.e. they 
depend on the country or region where they are implemented, and their success or 
failure depends on many factors such as: initial conditions, local institutions, agents' 
behavior and reaction to implemented policies, social context and culture, acceptance 
by agents, legality and trust, appropriateness of policies etc.    
Kolodko (1997) and other economists’ criticism
6 of the shock therapy is 
not because the so-called gradual process was not implemented a priori. Instead 
the main criticism is against some unnecessary shocks and measures that squeezed 
the economy and caused excessive overshooting. Some measures of the “shock 
therapy” package, such as price liberalization, legalization of private ownership, 
                                                 
5 In Poland the zloty was devaluated by about twenty times the purchasing power parity (PPP) index. In 
Hungary the national currency was devaluated by about 5 times the PPP and in Czech Republic by about 3 
times the PPP. See Nuti 1996. 
6 For instance, Nuti (1996); Calvo and Coricelli (1993).   13 
unification of exchange rate, and some liberalization of trade were necessary. 
However, the extension of those measures should be proportionate to the 
country’s initial conditions and should be announced a priori by the government. 
Other measures, such as the change  in institutions and organizations, the 
regulation of FDI, the opening to global markets, global competition, the 
organization of governmental and economic agencies,  the privatization of large 
and strategic SOE etc,  require more time and spread of information. Finally, other 
pragmatic measures, such as lowering import tariffs, should be considered in 
terms of a choice between gradualism and speed. 
I argue that the shock therapy should not have been implemented tout 
court just because the transformation from central planned economies to a market 
economy was incumbent, but the costs and benefits of different choices should 
have been analyzed. Each single policy should be implemented taking into 
account these trade-offs and depending on the results of single decisions. “The 
Big Bang [or shock therapy] not only ignores the lessons of history, it fails to 
provide the social and economic condition necessary to create a market economy. 
The basic error lies in the mistaken belief in the spontaneous appearance of 
capitalism market economy once property right is privatised, prices are set free, 
the currency is stabilised and unregulated competitive markets are introduced. 
This error of spontaneity creates serious impediments to discussion of the policies 
that will have to be formulated in a successful transformation strategy”.
7  
Moreover, a shock therapy, by definition, does not pay attention to social 
problems of transformation. On the contrary it focuses only on macro economic 
problems. Hence development dimensions, such as life expectancy, education 
level and living standards are not considered directly. The shock therapy approach 
assumes as a main hypothesis the old neoclassical paradigm according to which 
                                                 
7 Cfr. J.A. Kregel and E.Matzner, (1992: 35)    14 
development will come only after a macro stabilization and a GDP growth. At the 
same time a gradualist approach during transition would not be the first best per 
se. A gradualist approach would be an appropriate approach during a 
transformation only if development dimensions were considered as main targets, 
institutions were considered as key factors of development, and governance at 
different spatial levels, i.e. local, regional and national, managed the transition 
process. Transition is a very complex process; in the market economy the capital 
and labor allocation is completely different than in the centrally planned economy. 
All the formal institutions such as stock exchange, banks, investment funds, trade 
unions, property rights, enterprise confederations, and others are new. Their 
development is slow and affected by a "learning by doing" process. Because of 
that, a shock therapy (if it is conceived as Cold Turkey
8 tout court and not as 
single policies with trade-offs for each variable) was a poor strategy and likely 
brought important recession in the early 90's in Poland, and in several other 
CEECs, or in Russia and in other former Soviet Republics, in the mid-90's. On the 
contrary, the Chinese strategy of building market institutions by a gradual process, 
and implementing single policies has probably secured a more durable and 
sustainable economic growth
9. The great transformation was concurrent with a 
huge recession. In CEECs recession was from 20% to 40% of GDP, while in 
former Soviet Republics it was even worse and GDP fell in some cases by 60% of 
GDP. (See Appendix, table C) 
At the same time economic recovery was faster and more consistent in CEECs 
than in CSI. After ten years of transition, only few States reached or  exceeded the 1989 
level of GDP (i.e. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The rest among CEECs 
                                                 
8 This is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as 'abrupt withdrawal from addictive drugs'. 
9 During the 1990-2000 period, Russia’s economy lost 50% of GDP, the  Chinese GDP has doubled and 
Poland’s GDP has increased  by 27% .   15 
were still below that level. In the CSI the situation  is even worse with an average level 
of GDP at 61% of the 1989 figure. (Appendix, table C) 
The reasons of that different performance lay in the diverse initial 
conditions, different policies, and mistakes of policy makers (De Vincenti, 2002; 
Nuti, 2001). In general, after 15 years of transition, is widely accepted that 
governance and appropriate institutions are the key to the best performing 
countries during transition (Tridico 2004). During this process public 
interventionism and importance accorded to rules and institutions are necessary 
for a well-functioning market (De Vincenti, 2002: 12).  
 
3. The great recession 
 
According to Mundell (1997) in the early 90s, Central and Eastern European 
Countries and CIS experienced the biggest recession that happened in the economic 
European history during peace time. During this time, poverty and unemployment 
emerged. The Big Depression of 1929/30 generated similar phenomena but of smaller 
proportion. Mundell compared such crises only to The Big Plague (or the Black Death) 
of the XIV century. In Poland, where the recession was smaller, the GDP fell  by 
almost 20%, unemployment increased continually and the inflation rate reached   
dramatic levels. Poland lost at least a decade of development (Baldwin, 1994). In the 
following table we can observe the slump of the GDP in the early 90s and the following 
recovery among the best performing countries: 
 
Table 2. GDP change 1989-2001. Selected Countries. 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  GDP  level  2000,   
(1989=100) 
Poland 0.2  -11.7  -7 2.6 3.8 5.2  7  6 6.8 4.8 4.1  4 1.8  127 
Czech  R. 1.4  -1.2  -11.6  -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.8  -1  -2.3  -0.8 3.1 3.5  104 
Hungary 0.7  -3.5  -11.9  -3.1  -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 4.5  98 
Source: Transition Report, 2001 
The IMF forecasts about transition economies were wrong – as Gomulka, 
a former shock therapy supporter, recognised: for instance in Poland, where a   16 
shock therapy was implemented under IMF advices), the assumptions concerning 
GDP growth was: - 3.5% in 1990 against an actual - 11.4%, and +3.5% in 1991 
against an actual – 7.4%. “…The IMF team produced estimates, dated December 
5, 1989, that predicted the following monthly inflation rates: 42.6% in January, 
16.6% in February and 4.9% in March 1990” (Gomulka, 1995: 320)
10. Between 
1990-1991 Poland experienced a cumulate GDP recession of -18.8%. Inflation in 
1995 was still at 27.8%. 
Interestingly,   Svejnar (2002) wonders whether recession was inevitable 
or necessary. Of course the answer is not easy. According to Janos Kornai (1994), 
that recession was an inevitable transformational recession as a consequence of 
the systemic change in the economy and its institutions. Nevertheless, in the 
relevant economic literature several reasons are observable which may explain 
that recession: 
1.  The immediate collapse of the important communist trade block known as 
Comecon(Nuti, 2001). 
2. The  institutional  vacuum generated by the abrupt end of the previous system 
and the lack of an immediate substitute (Blanchard, 1997).  
3.  Bad working of allocation of goods and inputs, generated by uncertainty, lack 
of trust, crime, and chaos at the beginning of transition. Market exchanges 
were not developed, hence transaction costs and lack of information were very 
important (De Vincenti, 2002). 
4.  Errors and omissions contributed to deepen recession (Nuti, 2001). Mistakes 
of policymakers such as: fiscal squeeze, penalization of  public sector, over 
protection of exchange rates, often over valuated, with a very high interest 
rate, waste of monetary reserve in order to sterilize huge in-flow of foreign 
                                                 
10 “In early 1991, the flaws of the program were already apparent, but there was not time to renegotiate it, because 
on March 18, 1991, the Paris Club offered Poland an immediate 30% debt reduction. Conditional only on her 
having a Fund-supported economic program. The condition was met on April 18, 1991, and the reduction was 
granted on April 19, 1991”. (Gomulka, 1995: 337).   17 
capitals attracted by high interest rate, credit squeeze and credit rationing. 
Omissions  on the part of the new  governing class such as: public wages and 
pensions which were not paid in order to curb deficit; non-payment of public 
purchases. Lack of public investment, either ordinary or extraordinary. All this 
caused a strong de-monetization and often a barter (swap) economy. 
5.  The monopoly-type market strength of the new privatised undertakings which had 
inherited the old structure of the previous regime without any prior re-structuring. 
6. No attention was paid, in particular at the beginning of transition, to an 
institutional matter: institutions were not considered to be important for 
development; public institutions were neither substituted nor created; 
standards policies (i.e. the Washington Consensus) and international 
constraints were just accepted and implemented; culture, social capital, 
domestic norms and values were simply ignored; path-dependency theory 
was not considered relevant, etc
11. 
7. Moreover, the immediate liberalisation of prices targeting the elimination of 
distortions caused by the former artificially and badly price administration 
system, brought about the emergence of repressed and hidden inflation. Such 
a distortion in prices did not allow for an efficient allocation of productive 
resources and goods. As Nuti (1986) explained, such a distortion was one of 
the origins of repressed and hidden inflation during the 1980s in many former 
communist countries. During socialism the problem was that prices were 
administered and therefore not free to clear the market. So, the elimination of 
the gap between demand and supply was necessary. That mis-matching was 
the origin of the high inflation in Poland as in other CEECs as well as the 
origin of the well-known phenomenon of queues at the retail shops.  
                                                 
11 Cfr. J.A. Kregel and E.Matzner, (1992); Murrel (1992).    18 
However, as De Vincenti (2002) pointed out, the fall in production, 
caused by the abrupt closure of state owned enterprises, the decrease in 
employment, and consecutively in the aggregate demand, contributed to increase 
the inflation rate. Hence, a vicious cycle of Keynesian origin dominated the 
slump of former communist countries. Therefore, Keynesian policies should have 
been implemented instead in order to cope with that recession.     
 
4. The social cost of transition 
 
In the first years of transition, the most important aim of Government was 
macro-stabilisation (Balcerowicz, 1993): the fight against inflation, the reduction 
of debt, the liberalisation of prices, the budget balance and privatisation. All these 
aims were considered necessary by international organisations and main stream 
economists to allow economic growth. Nevertheless these results were not 
sufficient to stimulate long-term and sustainable growth.  
Transition economies are affected by very high unemployment rates, a 
growing inequality rate ( measured by GINI-coefficients), a considerable index of 
poverty (where, according to OECD, the percentage of workers represents the 
majority), a chronic current account deficit and a considerable foreign debt. 
Moreover informal economy and corruption levels strongly persist (Kaufmann et 
al., 1995). Obviously, among transition economies, situations are highly 
differentiated. Among the most advanced CEECs  it is evident that Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia experienced a smaller recovery in 
GDP, in comparison  with Poland, but a lower poverty rate, a lower inequality 
level, a lower unemployment rate, a lower corruption level and a lower informal 
economy level. This can be partly explained by the fact that Poland, during the first 
part of 1990s adopted an extreme “shock therapy” aiming at macro economic   19 
stabilisation, which had the effect  of squeezing  the economy, increasing 
unemployment and reducing people’s purchasing power (Kolodko and Nuti, 1997).  
Source: Transition Report 2001 
 
During transition many people became poorer. Economic benefits were not 
well distributed and today, in particular in the former Soviet Union, the majority 
of people have a lower living standard than before 1989.   The impoverishment of 
the people is the consequence of the economic crisis of the  early nineties: a huge 
fall in output, very high unemployment, the reduction in real wages and a rise in 
income inequalities. However the increase of poverty was different among 
countries (Ruminska-Zimny, 1997)   
Most of the poor people are concentrated in former Soviet Republics, where the 
initial poverty level was already significant, while in Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia the increase of poverty was modest (around 6%-9%, according 
to UNICEF 1995
12). Among CEECs a high level of poverty incidence is remarkable in 
                                                 
12 UNICEF measure of poverty line is equal to 60% of the low income. The low income was defined as a 
percentage between  35-60% of the average wage of 1989. In this way poverty line is not measured in absolute 











Poland 16,4 16 14,9 13,2 8,6 10,4 13 15
Czech Rep. 3,5 3,2 2,9 3,5 5,2 7,5 9,4 8,8
Hungary 14,5 12,4 12,1 11,8 11,6 10,1 9,9 9
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  20 
Poland, considered to be one of the advanced transition economies in reforms and 
economic performance (around 18%). At the same level there are Romania and 
Bulgaria. Baltic countries and Slavic countries of CSI experienced an important 
increase in poverty level, reaching the level of 40-46% in Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine 
and Russia, 65% in Moldova and 23% in Belarus and Latvia. In the Asian Republics of 
CIS, where pre-1989 poverty was already important, the poverty level reached dramatic 
levels: above 50% in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; around 76% in 
Kyrgyzstan; between 80-90% of the population in Tajikistan. In the Caucasus, poverty 
is exacerbated by military conflicts and civil war. UNICEF (1995) estimates a poverty 
level in Armenia and Azerbaijan around 65%; in Georgia, wages ($ 5 a month) are 
below the minimum subsistence of $ 31 a month (Ruminska-Zimny, 1997).    
Table 3. Poverty Index 1995 – selected countries 
POLAND            18.3% 
HUNGARY              9.3% 
SLOVAKIA             6.7% 
CZECH REPUBLIC              6.1% 
Former East GERMANY              6.6% 
Source: UNICEF 1995 
It is noticeable that despite the fact that Poland, first among the CEECs to start a 
transition process towards a market economy, has done remarkably well compared to 
the other CEECs as regards the macro-stabilisation of economy, still the Polish 
economy is affected by numerous problems which curb economic performance.  The 
consistent rise of poverty was caused by the collapse of the GDP, the dramatic fall in 
real wages, and by the increase of inequality. After 1992, poverty level stabilised  at a 
high level, but inequality continued to increase. Inequality was due to many factors 
such as liberalisation, privatisation and wage differences among people. The ensuing 
                                                                                                                                      
terms but reflects the condition of the specific country. In fact a poverty line of  PPP $ 4 a day (as considered by 
Milanovic 1996) would be to low for CEECs and would be to high for CIS.   21 
fast growth caused important wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers 
(Rutkowski 1996).  
The same can be said for Bulgaria, Romania, and for the Baltic Countries, which 
among CEECs, have the worst social indicators, i.e.: unemployment rate, poverty rate 
and inequality reach the same level  as in Poland. The dynamic of the Gini-coefficient 
shows a consistent increase of inequality in the first part of transition in Poland ( when a 
shock therapy was implemented), while in the second part it was more stable.
13 
The same figure appears in another “shock therapist” country, i.e. the 
Czech Republic. On the contrary Hungary managed the transition through a 
gradual therapy, more social oriented and institutionally aware. 
Table 4. GINI Coefficient dynamic 1988-2001 
  1988 1995 2001 
POLAND  25.6% 32.1% 33% 
CZECH  Rep.  19.4% 25.8% 27% 
HUNGARY 21%  24.2%  26% 
Source: Atkinson and Micklewright 1992. Transition Report 2001 
Economic transition was very costly in social terms, in particular in the 
former Soviet Union. Those countries, together with the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia, experienced tragic events, civil wars, crime domination and economy 
of chaos. Moreover, even in the case of  those countries, international financial 
organisations suggested  that the State should abandon the economy and 
implement a Washington Consensus oriented policy. Therefore they did not 
implement any institutional policies which would allow for an institutional 
governance, for the  protection of weaker and poorer people, or for conflict 
management. On the contrary, the sudden introduction of the market economy and 
the end of social policies, welfare state and income redistribution policies caused 
an increase in poverty, inequality and unemployment (Adam 1999).  
                                                 
13 As we will see in section 7, in the second part of transition, Poland implemented a very social 
oriented and institutionally aware strategy of transformation.   22 
 
Table 5. Gini coefficient %, in 2004   
Slovenia  28.04  Bulgaria 31.09  Armenia 37.09 
Czech Rep  25.04  Russian Fed  45.06  Turkmenistan  40.08 
Estonia  37.02  Macedonia, T  28.02  Azerbaijan  36.05 
Poland  31.00  Belarus 30.04  Georgia 36.09 
Hungary  24.04  Albania 28.02  Uzbekistan  26.08 
Lithuania  31.09  Bosnia and H  26.02  Kyrgyzstan  29.00 
Slovakia  25.08  Romania 30.03  Moldova,  Rep  36.02 
Croatia  29.00  Ukraine 29.00  Tajikistan  34.07 
Latvia  32.04  Kazakhstan 31.03     
    Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2004 
In a very interesting article, Kovalik (2001) states that “best performing” 
transition economies are still affected by many social problems, problems 
eliminated or greatly reduced by the older EU members long ago. He refers to the 
increase in poverty, inequality, corruption, gender discrimination, high 
unemployment, poverty among farmers and workers, dualism and increase of 
income divergences between regions of the same country, and other social 
problems. The “worst performing” transition economies are more greatly affected 
by those social problems, and their transformation seems to worsening human 
indicators such as life expectancy, education level and living standards.  
Hence, in general we can say that many shadows darken the balance of 
that transformation and the economic cost in terms of unemployment, poverty, 
reduction of well-being, and increase of inequality are very consistent. “It seems 
therefore, and perhaps it is not surprising, that the transformation of former 
communist countries has passed from a central planning system pure and simple 
underdevelopment, with the hope but not the certainty of a faster path towards the 
prosperity of advanced countries with a market economy” (Nuti, 1999).
 14  
 
                                                 
14 Nuti D.M., “1989-1999: la grande trasformazione dell’Europa centrorientale”, Europa/Europe, Nuova Serie, Anno 
VIII Numero Quattro, Bollati Boringhieri, (VI paragraph, own translation) 1999.   23 
5. A Human Development approach  
 
The idea that the GDP is an absolute and reliable measure of development has 
been widely criticised by aware development economists. Performance of 
countries in terms of GDP can be very different from basic development 
indicators (Noorbakhsh, 1996; Costantini and Monni, 2005). Morris (1979) was 
among the first to elaborate an index of socio-economic development (“the 
physical quality of life index”), which was built on the basis of three indicators, 
i.e.: infant mortality, literacy, and life expectancy. The United Nations (UN) were 
always very sensitive about the socio-economic level reached by countries. 
According to the UN, it was clear that development does not mean growth. 
During the seventies, the UN started to study a different economic development 
approach according to which developing countries should satisfy some “basic 
needs”, through public policies (Streeten, 1979).  The following theoretical 
contribution of Amartya Sen (1985), and his “capability approach”, was crucial 
for further investigations about development indicators. In 1990 the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) published its first Human Development 
Report where a composite index of human development (HDI) was presented.  
 A good deal of empirical evidence shows that both in developing and in 
developed economies, some countries have relatively high GDP per capita but 
very low indicators of development such as literacy, access to drinking water, rate 
of infant mortality, life expectancy, education, etc. This is in part due to the fact 
that wealth is unequally distributed. Vice versa, there are cases of relatively low 
GDP per capita and high indicators of development in countries where income is 
more equally distributed (Ray 1998). For instance Guatemala has a GDP per 
capita higher than Sri Lanka, but inequality is much higher in Guatemala. 
Development indicators are much better in Sri Lanka than in Guatemala. Life   24 
expectancy (years): 72 against 65; infant mortality rate (per 1000): 18 against 48; 
Access to safe water (% of pop.): 60 against 62; adult literacy rate (%): 89 against 
54 (Human Development Report, UNDP, 1995). Examples like this are numerous 
and non-perfect correspondence between GDP and Development indicators can be 
observed even in industrialised countries, where there are more resources to 
distribute.  As a result, the UNDP taxation of Human Development Indexes and 
GDP rank, is not at all coincident (Human Development Report, UNDP, 1999).  
The UNDP Human development Index is a composite index, ranking 
between 0-1, which is the combination of two non-income dimensions of people’s 
lives and one income dimension. The first one is life expectancy at birth, which 
reflects infant mortality too. The second one is educational attainment, which is a 
combination of primary, secondary and tertiary educational level and adult 
literacy rate. The third element is an adjusted GDP index which reflects income 
per capita measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) at US$ (Human 
Development Report, UNDP, 1990).  
According to the UNDP definition, human development is a process of 
enlarging people’s choices. That is achieved by expanding human capabilities and 
functioning (Sen, 1999). In order to expand human capabilities institutions are 
needed. Institutional policies would allow for improving the three essential 
capabilities for human development: i.e. leading long and healthy lives, being 
knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. This approach assumes 
that economic growth requires first of all investment in human development. Poor 
countries such as China, Sri Lanka and Indonesia had relatively high human 
development levels and a very low GDP per capita in 1975. Development 
economists mostly agree that these higher human development levels made it 
possible for them to have a faster growth (UNDP, 2004). Today those countries have   25 
relatively high GDP per capita, in comparison with other developing countries.
15 On 
the contrary in 1975 poor countries such as Pakistan, Ghana, and Nigeria had very 
low levels of human development, and after 25 years they are still poor, with very 
low GDP per capita.
16  
Of course the link between human development and growth is not 
automatic. The evidence is very controversial. For instance there is evidence of a 
stable or improved level of human development together with economic decline, 
such as in Tajikistan; or again human development in a reverse direction with 
respect to economic growth such as in the case of Botswana, which experienced 
good economic growth with a reduction in human development level (from 1975 
to 2002), due to worsening of life expectancy and health levels.  In the next 
section I will test my causality relation hypothesis (i.e. Human Development → 
GDP growth in the case of transition economies). Mainstream economists argue 
that GDP is the best proxy for development, but then they can not hidden the 
numerous evidences of growth without development
17. Hence it seems to us that a 
composite index of human development, where a GDP is only one of the different 
elements which determine it along others which concern human life, is the best 
proxy, indeed, of “development” as it is widely intended.  
 
6. Human development and economic growth in transition Economies 
 
The human development level in transition economies is relatively high 
thanks to previous investments made in social dimensions by previous regimes. 
Nevertheless, the transition process influenced the non-income dimensions of 
                                                 
15 China’s GDP per capita, in PPP US$, in 2002 was 4.580, Sri Lanka’s GDP per capita, in PPP US$ in 2002 was 
3.570, Indonesia’s GDP per capita, in PPP US$, in 2002 was 3.230 (UNDP 2004). 
16 Pakistan’s GDP per capita, in PPP US$, in 2002 was 1.940, Ghana’s GDP per capita, in PPP US$ in 2002 was 
2.130, Nigeria’s GDP per capita, in PPP US$, in 2002 was 860 (UNDP 2004).  
17 For details about this debate see: Anand and Harris 1994; Desai 1991; Naqvi 1995; Srinivasan 1994; Streeten 
(1994).   26 
people, often worsening the main indicators. (Ruminska-Zimny, 1997). Death 
rates increased and life expectancy declined in particular in CIS and in the Baltic 
States. The second dimension of HDI, i.e. access to education, slowed too. After 
1989, public expenditure on education decreased as a consequence of GDP fall, 
and the public education system worsened. The same as regards public expenditures 
on health, which contracted in many countries because of the slump in GDP. Moreover, 
lack of investments and technology in this sector contributed to reduce the quite high 
standard of those countries during the previous regime. Today, services and 
performances are negatively affected by obsolete infrastructures, hospitals, machines, 
etc. Very often, the privatization of health care services contributed to create a second 
class health care system. People with low income, and in general the losers of the 
transition, cannot afford the more expensive and more advanced private heath care 
services.  
However the situation is very different among CEECs and CIS, and further 
detailed observations are needed. First of all, transition economies have an 
average level of human development (0.796) above the world average (0.729), 
and higher than all other countries, except for OECD countries (0.911), as a 
heritage of the communist era. However, I have to say that unlike developing 
countries, in transition economies, Human Development Index does not capture 
all dimensions of development and of individual well-being, because one 
important variable is missing, that is unemployment rate. If that neglecting can be 
tolerated for Developing Countries analyses, it is difficult to justify in former 
communist countries, where unemployment level was very low before 1989 and 
increased dramatically during the transition process.
18  
Secondly, different initial conditions (at the starting date of transition 
1989/1990) among transition economies are evident in terms of human 
                                                 
18 In fact this type of criticism can be accepted and can be an incentive for further researches. Sen (1987) says 
that in some case the simple HDI does not capture all dimensions of development.   27 
development and in terms of GDP per capita. Thirdly, countries which 
implemented institutional policies, social policies and a governance recovery, 
filling the initial power vacuum, increased their level of human development. 
Finally, countries with higher level of human development performed better in 
terms of GDP growth and recovery than countries with lower level of human 
development (see Appendix, table B). Therefore, a higher level of human 
development, seems to be the major cause of a faster economic growth. On the 
contrary, countries which did not implement such institutional policies did not 
increase their level of human development and economic growth was neither fast 
nor sufficient to recover the pre-1989 level of GDP per capita.  
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1  Slovenia  0,895     1  Slovenia  0,87  18,540  3 
2  Czech Republ  0,868     2  Czech Republ  0,84  15,780  7 
3  Estonia  0,853     3  Hungary  0,82  13,400  10 
4  Poland  0,85     4  Slovakia  0,81  12,840  13 
5  Hungary  0,848     5  Estonia  0,8  12,260  3 
6  Lithuania  0,842     6  Poland  0,78  10,560  10 
7  Slovakia  0,842     7  Lithuania  0,77  10,320  1 
8  Croatia  0,83     8  Croatia  0,77  10,240  4 
9  Latvia  0,823     9  Latvia  0,75  9,210  6 
10  Bulgaria  0,796     10  Russian Fed  0,74  8,230  10 
11  Russian Fed  0,795     11  Bulgaria  0,71  7,130  3 
12  Macedonia, T  0,793     12  Macedonia, T  0,7  6,560  15 
13  Belarus  0,79     13  Romania  0,7  6,470  24 
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
14  Albania  0,781     14  Bosnia and H  0,68  5,970  31 
15  Bosnia and H  0,781     15  Kazakhstan  0,68  5,870  15 
16  Romania  0,778     16  Belarus  0,67  5,520  5 
17  Ukraine  0,777     17  Albania  0,65  4,870  25 
18  Kazakhstan  0,766     18  Ukraine  0,65  4,830  4 
19  Armenia  0,754     19  Turkmenistan  0,63  4,300  33 
20  Turkmenistan  0,752     20  Azerbaijan  0,58  3,210  16 
21  Azerbaijan  0,746     21  Armenia  0,57  3,120  23   28 
22  Georgia  0,739     22  Georgia  0,52  2,260  29 
23  Uzbekistan  0,709     23  Uzbekistan  0,47  1,670  35 
24  Kyrgyzstan  0,701     24  Kyrgyzstan  0,46  1,620  33 
25  Moldova, Rep  0,681     25  Moldova, Rep.  0,45  1,470  36 
26  Tajikistan  0,671     26  Tajikistan  0,38  980  45 
Source: Author’s elaboration on UNDP database (2004) 
* Based on the life expectancy index, education index, and the GDP index;  
** HDI rank minus GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank.  A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is 
higher than the GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank, a negative the opposite. 
 
This is a very interesting point which is confirmed by a simple regression 
model. Using an OLS method I found out that GDP index is positively and strongly 
correlated with the Human Development Index (HDI). In the following regression I 
used the “Life expectancy index” and the “Educational index” as independent variables 
for human development, and the GDP index
19 as a dependent variable. I did not run a 
regression between GDP index and HDI (with HDI as the only regressor) since there 
could be an auto-correlation problem (the GDP index is one of the three dimensions 




Dependent Variable: GDP index 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 26 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  P-Value 
Life Expectancy index  1.661743  0.414746  0.0006* 
Eucation index  2.127335  0.538301  0.0006* 
Constant -2.563643  0.627456  0.0005* 
Adjusted R-squared 0.545264 
*Significance level at 1%. Source: Author’s elaboration 
                                                 
19 The GDP index strongly reflects the GDP level in US$ Purchasing Power Parity. 
20 However, I do not want to conclude with a simple cross-country study that HDI determines GDP. In 
general it depends on dimensions of HD considered and of Countries analysed. Indeed, the debate in such 
field is quite vibrant. See for instance Desai (1991); Naqvi (1995); Ranis et al., (2003) for similar results. 
While Anand and Harris (1994); Srinivasan (1994), consider GDP as a good indicator for Human 
Development too. Ranis et al., (2000), recognise that both, GDP and HDI, are consistently correlated in both 
























Chart 1.  Source: Author’s elaboration 
In order to confirm our direction causality hypothesis and results, at least in 
the specific case of transition economies, I present data with GDP index as an 
independent variable, and Human development dimensions (Life expectancy and 
education) as dependent variables, singularly taken. We can observe a much lower 
level of R-square and significance with a lower level of P-value, and a lower 
magnitude of coefficients in both regressions in comparison with the previous one.  
 
Table 8 
Dependent Variable: Education index  Dependent Variable: Expectancy index 
Method: Least Squares  Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 26  Included observations: 26 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  P-Value  Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  P-Value 
GDP 0.190107  0.048105  0.1006**  Education  -0.639671  0.233741  0.1118** 
LIFE -0.384008  0.140319  0.1118** GDP  0.247367 0.061739  0.1006** 
C 1.086289  0.097021  0.0000* C  1.193062  0.198133  0.0000* 
Adjusted R-squared 0.366889  Adjusted R-squared 0. 373947 
* Significance level at 1%. ** = scarce level of significance. Source: Author’s elaboration 
Very interestingly, the trend of the human development index during 
transition is very heterogeneous according to the policies and institutions 
implemented (see Appendix, table B). For instance in Poland HDI in the first part 
of transition (1990-1995) passed from 0.802 to a mere 0.816, while at the end of   30 
the second part of transition (in 2002) it reached 0.85. That is why in the second 
part of transition good institutional policies, governance mechanism and reform 
were introduced. These policies made possible a recovery from the decline of the first 
part of transition, caused probably, at least partly, by a shock therapy program. In the 
second part of transition, in fact, a more oriented institutional program was 
implemented with the introduction of “Strategy for Poland”. In Slovenia, on the 
contrary, a gradual macroeconomic approach to transition made possible the 
introduction of appropriate institutions and policies, avoiding the power vacuum which 
happened in other transition countries. The following table shows which kind of 
macroeconomic strategy, in general, transition economies adopted during 1990-2000. 
Table 9 
COUNTRIES   TYPE OF MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION 
Eastern Germany   Immediately united to West Germany (particular kind of 
“shock Therapy”). 
Poland,. Czech Rep., Slovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia 
Speed Reforms, started with a macro-stabilisation. 
Implementation of privatisation, liberalisation and trade 
openness policies (“shock Therapy” program). 
Hungary and Slovenia  “Gradual” macro-stabilisation; strong institutional framework, 
gradual privatisation. 
Bulgaria and Albania  Reforms started very late, but then implemented through a 
“shock therapy ”; corruption.  
Romania and Russia   Reforms started but then stopped, not-coordinated, bad 
managed, corruption. 
Ukraine and Belarus  None or insufficient reforms, iper-inflation, unstable 
economies and politics, corruption. 
Former Yugoslavia (except Slovenia). 
Other former Soviet Republics 
(Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) 
Military conflicts, civil wars, instability of politics and 
economies, no reforms, except for Croatia which started later a 
gradual and successful transition 
Asian Republics of the CIS 
(former URSS) 
Political instability, no reforms, longer and deeper economic 
recession,  corruption. 
Source: Lavigne, 1999   31 
Slovenia and Poland together with Hungary and the Czech Republic are the 
best countries in terms of HDI trend and did not experience a negative change 
during transition.  Consequently, those countries experienced a faster GDP growth 
and reached or  overtook the pre-1989 level of GDP per capita before 2000. 
Between 1991 and 1997, Slovenia and Poland in particular adopted socially-
oriented policies and institutions which made possible HDI growth and 
simultaneously GDP growth. However human development was not concurrent for 
all the countries with GDP growth during transition. On the other hand we can 
observe evidence of growth, or economic recovery, or relatively no recession, 
without a consistent development in the following countries: Albania, Latvia, 
Croatia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Belarus and Uzbekistan. All these countries 
in fact reached, and in some cases (i.e. Slovakia, Albania and Estonia) surpassed, 
the pre-1989 level of GDP per capita between 2002 and 2004. In other countries, 
the level of Human development remained stable or decreased and the economy 
also collapsed. These countries are: Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Tajikistan, 
Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Macedonia 
TFRY, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Plus Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro, 
whose data however are, obviously, not greatly significant or reliable. Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Moldova have the lowest level of GDP per capita 
among all transition economies. Hence the empirical evidence is quite diverse and 
controversial, as the chart below shows. I should expect observations (dots for life 
expectancy index and triangles for education index) in the northeast and southwest 
parts of the chart, in order to confirm the positive relation between GDP and HDI. 
On the contrary we can see a lot of observations in the central part or even in the 
“wrong” part. For instance high GDP with low life expectancy index (southeast part 
in the chart). A smaller number of observations can be noticed in the northwest part 











Chart 2.  Source: Author’s elaboration 
In general, only countries which experienced an increase in their human 
development level had a sustained economic growth. Hence it seems to us that, in 
transition economies, human development is a sufficient, yet not a necessary, 
condition for economic growth.  This means that there can be economic growth 
without human development, but if there is human development then there will be 
economic growth.  
In particular, it seems that the factor which has a more important impact on 
the GDP level of analysed countries, is the education index, whose β coefficient, 
in the regression model above presented is 2.127335. While the β coefficient of 
life expectancy index is lower, i.e.: 1.661743. This reflects the life expectancy 
index average in former communist countries which is lower than the education 
index average, i.e.: 0.74 against 0.93.    33 
  Source: Source: Author’s elaboration on UNDP database (2004) 
In the former Soviet Union the lack of any implementation of institutional 
policy was lethal. Socially oriented policies were suddenly substituted by the 
economy of chaos, and by a free market without institutions. The withdrawal of 
the State from the economy caused a colossal fall in output and an explosion of 
unemployment. Social indicators immediately worsened. As a result, the relatively 
high HDI of those countries decreased or, in the best of cases, did not increase 
during the 1990-2000 decade. Consequently economic growth was negative, as 
the following table suggests, and in many cases those countries still have not 
reached the pre-transition level of GDP per capita (see Appendix, table C). 
 













Slovenia 4,2  0,048*  Albania  6 0,101 
Czech Rep  1,4  0,028*  Bosnia and H  18  NA 
Estonia 2,3 0,042  Romania 0,1  0,008 







































hdi  34 
Poland 4,2 0,056  Ukraine -6  -0,027 
Hungary 2,4  0,048  Kazakhstan  -0,7  -0,001 
Lithuania -0,3  0,022  Armenia  1,7 0,003 
Slovakia 2,1  NA  Turkmenistan  -3,2  NA 
Croatia 2,1 0,028  Azerbaijan  0,2  NA 
Latvia 0,2  0,019  Georgia  -3,9  NA 
Bulgaria -2  0,001  Uzbekistan  -0,9  0,031* 
Russian Fed  -2,4  -0,022  Kyrgyzstan  -3,2  NA 
Macedonia,T -0,7  NA Moldova,  Re  -6,9  -0,081 
Belarus 0,2 0,006  Tajikistan  -8,1  -0,071 
*% Change in HDI (1995/2002). Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2004 
A simple regression model applied to the data above shows the strong 
relation existing between the annual average GDP growth during 1990-2002 and 
the percentage of change in HDI for the same period.
21  
 
7. Institutions, Governance and Development  
 
As an important example of empirical evidence of good economic 
performance reached with good governance and institutions, I can present the case 
of Poland at least during the second phase of transition i.e. during 1994-1997. The 
better performance of Poland, in terms of GDP recovery, in comparison to other 
CEECs
22, is in fact the result of the high growth between 1994 and 1997 (see table 
11). During that period in Poland a special economic and social program was 
implemented, the so-called “Strategy for Poland”, which highlights, according to 
De Vincenti (1998: 57) a “new course in Poland”. This program seems to create 
that institutional framework that  was missing at the beginning of Transition.    
 
                                                 
21 However in this case, with two variables only (i.e. GDP growth and HDI growth), serious autocorrelation 
problems would affect our model, whose data are hence not presented here.  
22 In fact Poland was the only Country, among CEECs and CIS, to overcame, during 1997-1998, the level of 
GDP of 1989.   35 
Table 11. Poland: GDP change in % 1989-2001. GDP level 1989 =100 
  Years  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 GDP 
change 
% 0,2  11,6  -7  2,6  3,8  5,2 7 6  6,8  4,8 4,1  4 0,2 
GDP 
level 100  81  100  127 
Source: Transition Report 2002 
“Strategy for Poland” confirms an important principle: if institutions are 
important for a development process, then institutional policies are fundamental. 
The guidelines of the new program  target both  macro economic stability and the 
reinforcement of the State's role in economy through public expenditure, 
infrastructure building, guarantee of welfare state, improvement of purchasing 
power of poorer people, protection of weaker people in the new market context, 
etc. With “Strategy for Poland” a new social pact between trade unions, business 
clubs, organisations and government emerged. That pact involved several groups 
and classes of Polish society such as: workers, retired people, business men, 
bureaucrats, foreigner investors, farmers, etc. This type of pact had been badly 
neglected during the implementation of the IMF program; the latter had aiming 
only at monetary stability, public budget, deficit reduction and anti-inflation 
target. Below I resume the main policies of that program. 
•  Public investments in order to build important public infrastructures  
•  Social policies aiming at giving “basic economic and social rights” (social 
institutions building) 
•  Rigorous fiscal policy but not necessarily avoiding deficit  
•  Building agency and services aiming at helping trade, matching of Demand 
and Supply and market exchanges in order to reduce transaction costs  
•  A minimum wage and guarantee against wages that were too low. Introduction 
of a system of wage agreement between trade unions, business clubs, and 
government   36 
•  Guarantee for previously accumulated pension contributions and social security  
•  A monetary policy that was less strict than previously, cutting of the interest 
rate, and saving for debt services. 
•  Easier access to foreign reserves with less strict rules for their accumulation  
•  Banking and financial policies in order to favour financial agencies, credit 
access, and trust between operators, firms and banks.  
•  Incentives for the emersion of firms from the black and illegal markets, 
fighting against corruption and crime. 
•  Gradual privatisation for bigger firms and faster privatisation for smaller ones.  
•  Policies helping legality, law certainty, property rights distribution, respect of 
contract, guarantee for foreign investors, etc.  
•  Introduction of an incentive system for agriculture similar to the one in force 
in the EU with Common Agriculture Policy  
•  Antitrust  law and agency, consumer guarantee, information agencies  for 
foreign investors, regulation of FDI in special zones,  
Those policies are considered as a recovery of governance which allows 
for an improvement in human development and, consequently, a recovery of GDP 
after the huge recession of the beginning of 90s (De Vincenti, 1998: 60). That 
governance recovery was lacking and is still lacking in other former Communist 
countries such as Russia and other former Soviet Republics, some CEECs such as 
Romania and Bulgaria in particular. The financial crisis in Russia and in other 
CEECs such as the Czech Republic in the second half of the 90s seems to be 
originated from a lack of governance in the economic and financial system of 
those countries. Moreover the same lack of governance and appropriate 
institutions seems to cause a high level of the informal economy, corruption, 
uncertainty of property rights, mistrust, which negatively affect the economic 
performance of former Soviet Republics, Romania and Bulgaria, and, to some   37 
extent, also the performances of the other CEECs, new members of the European 
Union. However, in general, UE’s new member States are the most advanced in 
both reforms towards the market economy, and GDP recovery (cfr. EBRD 
indexes: Transition Report, 2001). For those countries, EU membership promise, 
has played the role of both a macroeconomic discipline and of an institutional 
convergence. Therefore, social and institutional policies were also implemented.  
Through  a “Strategy for Poland”, during the years 1994-1997 the Polish 
economy took the right path towards a development process which involved not 
only a GDP recovery but also the informal economy, social security, education 
improvement and the fight against unemployment. However after that period that 
strategy was abandoned (Kolodko, 2004) and no longer implemented, with 
negative effects on social performances. Hence the Polish economic situation is 
not better today than other advanced CEECs (Hungary, the Czech Rep., Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Estonia). On the contrary, the unemployment rate is very high, as are 
the inequality and poverty indices. Moreover GDP growth during the first three 
years of 2000 was very low.  
In order to reach a considerable level of human development and to make 
development less uneven, three conditions are fundamental, together with GDP 
growth. They are 1) management of social conflicts, 2) reducing inequality, 3) 
giving economic opportunities and to exploit those opportunities. Economic 
institutions play an important role  in those aims. Olson et al. (1998) show that 
better governance and quality of institutions are the main sources of economic 
growth and determine the differences between the output of the various 
countries
23. Along the same lines, Jones and Hall (1998) find that “Social 
Infrastructure” and governmental policies explain the different levels, among 
                                                 
23 Governance and quality of institutions are measured by Olson et al.(1998)  by means of various  indices: 
The Risk of Expropriation; The Risk of Repudiation of Contracts by Governments; Quality of Bureaucracy; 
Level of Corruption ; Law and Order Tradition; International Country Risk.   38 
countries, of a residual productivity, which in turn is at the basis of the level of 
those countries' output. Moreover Rodrik (1999) shows that better performing 
countries, in terms of GDP per capita, are those which succeed in managing social 
conflicts through appropriate institutions. The world market is a source of 
disruption and upheaval as much as it is an opportunity for profit and economic 
growth. Without the complementary institutions at home – in the area of 
governance, judiciary, civil liberties, social insurance, and education – one gets 
too much of the former and too little of the  latter. The weakness of the domestic 
institutions of conflict management was the Achilles’ heel of the development 
strategy pursued in Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere, and this is 
what made countries in these regions so susceptible to the external shocks of the 
1970s. (Rodrik, 1999: 96) 
For institutional economists, the link between institutions and development 
is very clear: formal and informal rules define a system of penalties and prizes 
which determine a set of standardised behavioural patterns. These patterns in turn 
shape both individual and collective action affecting economic performance and 
development. Hence, development policies should promote an institutional change 
i.e. a change in the values and in the rules which inhibit growth, and not only a 
change of formal rules or the implementation of reforms (i.e. structural adjustment 
which in social terms may be very costly.  
Since “institutions matter”, it is important to implement institutional 
policies. Hence, the question is how to change institutions, how to implement a 
new institutional deal, which will bring about economic development. 
Development is defined by sophisticated economists as economic growth and (or 
plus) institutional change (Toye, 1995). But since institutions are defined by 
aware institutional economists as social rules or norms, with a set of values on the 
basis, then to change institutions we need to change those norms and their values. 
Hence the right definition seems to be: “development as growth through   39 
institutional change” Fadda (2003: 15). In other words a development process is a 
breaking with previous institutions, routines and norms and the overcoming of  
“the resistance of established interest and values” that previously impeded 
economic growth (Kuznets, 1965).   
At this point, it is important to underline the connection between Sen’s 
notion of “capability” and a definition of institution, both of  which are crucial for 
economic development. As Fadda (2003:7) puts it: “choices are determined to a 
large extent by what we want to do, and this is determined by capabilities, as 
elements of institutions, and capabilities should not be taken as given”. Hence, we 
can re-elaborate the definition of development given above, such as an economic 
growth through an institutional change with a determinant role of capabilities. 
In transition economies, political “…freedom has been accompanied by 
the loss of many basic economic and social rights” (UNDP,2000:12). This 
affected negatively people capabilities of doing and being. Consecutively, their 
economic and social freedom, in Sen’s terms of “development as freedom 
“(1999), worsened because many opportunities disappeared. Hence, today, in the 
worst performing transition economies (basically all CIS and a few CEECs), 
people acquired, in the best case, political voice but not freedom in general terms. 
In contrast to the Washington Consensus approach, an institutional 
approach takes into consideration an institutional framework, with its values and 
informal rule and not only the reformation or the introduction of a limited number 
of standard institutions. Moreover, this approach does not have a standard and 
general recipe for development; rather it offers a wider analysis  in accordance 
with which policy makers can implement  a number of context dependent policies 
refered to the particular situation of the country or of the region.  
Economic development and institutional economics can be considered two 
faces of the same coin. Institutional policies and development policies will come   40 
together to make development less uneven and economics more real, and to 
improve living standards. As Coase (1984) puts it: “In the real world, to influence 
economic policy we work through institutions. The choice in economic policy is a 
choice of institutions. And what matters is the effects that a modification in these 




The analysis proposed seems to suggest that, although necessary, macro-
economic stabilisation was not a sufficient condition for economic growth. Moreover 
there is also little evidence so far that growth reduces income poverty. For instance in 
Poland, which experienced fast growth during the middle of the nineties, income 
poverty did not fall (Golinowska, 1996). To some extent the same happened in 
Hungary. On the contrary I found that human development, promoted by institutional 
policies, seems a sufficient condition for economic growth.  
Finally some lessons can be drawn from the transition process so far. The 
transition towards a new system involves values and systemic change, therefore it 
needs time proper institutions, and governance ability. CEECs and CIS transition 
has high social costs. Poverty , which emerged consistently, will not be defeated 
simply by economic growth. Distribution policies and an institutional approach 
which help to manage conflicts and to reinforce social cohesion are needed. 
Human development intended as the widening of people's choices is possible 
under appropriate institutional policies which give people capabilities of doing 
and of being: opportunities, access to health, education and the job market. The 
role of the state in creating such conditions is essential. The state, through its 
policies, creates the educational system, the health system and income 
opportunities. Furthermore, institutional policies would allow people to reach 
opportunities to improve their level of capabilities.    41 
Transition was managed very differently among the various countries, and 
it yielded different outcomes in terms of growth and development.  Institutions 
made the difference in Poland, Slovenia and to some extent Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. On the contrary a clear institutional approach was missing in the 
former Soviet Republics, in Bulgaria and Romania, and in some former 
Yugoslavian countries which were affected by the war. In particular we can 
distinguish five groups of countries.  
1. Countries  which  clearly increased both their level of HDI and their GDP
24. 
They are very few  in number (Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary) and are where, soon or later during nineties, social oriented 
reforms, income distribution policies, conflict management institutions, 
social pacts, welfare support, were introduced. 
2. Countries which did not increase either their HDI or their GDP level. 
These are countries where transition never even started. Basically, they 
still have a planned economy and do not enjoy pluralism and a high level 
of democracy. They are Uzbekistan, Belarus, and to some extent 
Turkmenistan. 
3.  Countries which experienced an increase in income without a 
correspondent and consistent increase in HDI (i.e. Albania, Latvia, 
Croatia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia). 
4.  The majority of countries experienced a reduction of HDI and a reduction 
of income levels: Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Macedonia (TFRY); plus Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia-Montenegro. They are the worst performing transition economies.  
5.  Few Countries experienced a stable HD level and a reduction of the 
income: Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.  
                                                 
24 I.e. countries which did not register a negative change in HDI during 1990-2002 and which had a GDP 
level greater in 2002 than in 1989. See Appendix, table B.   42 
However, as we saw, poverty increased dramatically in all former URSS 
countries and in some CEECs too.  What we did not observe is a clear increase in 
HDI without an increase in GDP. This is an important empirical result which 
supports the idea of investing in human development to increase GDP. GDP 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A. Human Development Index 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2004 
Notes: 
* Based on the life expectancy index, education index, and the GDP index;  
** HDI rank minus GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank. A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is higher than the GDP 
























High Human Development           
27 Slovenia  0,85  0,96  0,87  0,895  3 
32 Czech  Republic  0,84  0,92  0,84  0,868  7 
36 Estonia  0,78  0,98 0,8  0,853  10 
37 Poland  0,81  0,96  0,78  0,85  13 
38 Hungary  0,78  0,95  0,82  0,848  3 
41 Lithuania  0,79  0,96  0,77  0,842  10 
42 Slovakia  0,81  0,91  0,81  0,842  1 
48 Croatia  0,82  0,9  0,77  0,83  4 
50   Latvia  0,76  0,95  0,75  0,823  6 
Medium Human Development           
56 Bulgaria  0,77  0,91  0,71  0,796  10 
57 Russian  Federation  0,69  0,95  0,74  0,795  3 
60 Macedonia,  TFYR  0,81  0,87 0,7  0,793  15 
62 Belarus  0,75  0,95  0,67  0,79  24 
65 Albania  0,81  0,89  0,65  0,781  31 
66 Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  0,82  0,84  0,68  0,781  15 
69 Romania  0,76  0,88 0,7  0,778  5 
70 Ukraine  0,74  0,94  0,65  0,777  25 
78 Kazakhstan  0,69  0,93  0,68  0,766  4 
82 Armenia  0,79  0,9  0,57  0,754  33 
86 Turkmenistan  0,7  0,93  0,63  0,752  16 
91 Azerbaijan  0,78  0,88  0,58  0,746  23 
97 Georgia  0,81  0,89  0,52  0,739  29 
107 Uzbekistan  0,74  0,91 0,47  0,709  35 
110 Kyrgyzstan  0,72  0,92 0,46  0,701  33 
113 Moldova,  Rep.  of  0,73  0,87 0,45  0,681  36 
116 Tajikistan  0,73  0,9 0,38  0,671  45   49 
Table B. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX TREND 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2004.  
Last column: Author’s elaboration on EBRD data, Transition Report 2003 
Notes: 






HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX TREND  
Average 
Gdp_Growth 
High human development  
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 
 1990-2002 
27  Slovenia  .. .. .. .. 0,852  0,883  0,895  4,2 
32  Czech  Republic  .. .. .. .. 0,843  0,856  0,868  1,4 
36 Estonia  ..  ..  ..  0,817  0,796  0,839  0,853 2,3 
37  Poland  .. .. .. 0,802  0,816  0,843  0,85  4,2 
38 Hungary  0,777 0,793 0,807 0,807 0,81  0,837 0,848  2,4 
41 Lithuania  ..  ..  ..  0,823  0,789  0,829  0,842 -0,3 
42  Slovakia  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,842  2,1 
48 Croatia  ..  ..  ..  0,806  0,798  0,823  0,83 2,1 
50   Latvia  ..  0,795  0,807  0,807  0,765  0,808  0,823 0,2 
Medium  human  development           
56 Bulgaria  ..  0,768  0,788  0,795  0,784  0,791  0,796 -2 
57 Russian  Federation  ..  ..  ..  0,813  0,771  ..  0,795 -2,4 
60  Macedonia,  TFYR  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,793  -0,7 
62 Belarus  ..  ..   0,785  0,752  0,775  0,79 0,2 
65 Albania  ..  ..  0,691 0,702 0,702 0,74  0,781  6 
66  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,781  18 
69 Romania  ..  ..  ..  0,771  0,769  0,773  0,778 0,1 
70 Ukraine  ..  ..  ..  0,798  0,751  0,762  0,777 -6 
78 Kazakhstan  ..  ..  ..  0,767  0,725  0,744  0,766 -0,7 
82 Armenia  ..  ..  ..  0,751  0,708  ..  0,754 1,7 
86  Turkmenistan  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,752  -3,2 
91  Azerbaijan  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,746  0,2 
97  Georgia  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,739  -3,9 
107  Uzbekistan  .. .. .. .. 0,687  .. 0,709  -0,9 
110  Kyrgyzstan  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,701  -3,2 
113 Moldova,  Rep.  of  ..  ..  ..  0,736  0,684  0,673  0,681 -6,9 
116 Tajikistan  ..  ..  0,719  0,719  0,651  0,655  0,671 -8,1   50 
Table C. GDP change 1989-2001 (in %) 
 
 
Source: Transition Report, 2001 
 
 
 
 